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Abstract: The increased of price volatility due to positive initial returns will reduce investor confidence
and impact on the overall market. Market stabilization mechanism is needed to control the price volatility.
This research is intended to explore the effectiveness of Green-Shoe Option in reducing stock price volatility
after IPO. This study is done through GARCH model development intended to identify the volatility of
IPO shares price. This research compares the volatility price of company shares that apply Green shoe
option at IPO with companies that do not apply it. The result of this research on companies that conduct
IPO on 2000-2013 periods showed that the green shoe option stabilization program which was used by
the issuers was effective in muffing the stock prices’ volatility. Therefore, according to researchers Green
Shoe Option stabilization program can be used to prevent or ease the drop of shares price under Public
offering.
Abstrak: Peningkatan volatilitas harga akibat adanya initial return yang positif  akan mengurangi kepercayaan
investor dan berdampak pada pasar secara keseluruhan. Mekanisme stabilisasi pasar d iperlukan untuk
mengontrol volatilitas harga. Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk mengeksplorasi keefektifan Green-Shoe Option
dalam mengurangi volatilitas harga saham setelah IPO. Studi ini dilakukan dengan mengembangkan model
GARC H yang d imaksudkan untuk mengidentifikasi volatilitas harga saham IPO. Penelitian ini
membandingkan volatilitas harga saham perusahaan yang menerapkan Green-Shoe Option pada saat IPO
dengan perusahaan yang tidak menerapkannya. Hasil penelitian ini pada perusahaan yang melakukan IPO
pada periode 2000-2013 menunjukkan bahwa program stabilisasi Green-Shoe Option yang digunakan oleh
emiten efektif dalam meredam volatilitas harga saham. Oleh karena itu, menurut para peneliti, program
stabilisasi Green-Shoe Option dapat digunakan untuk mencegah atau mengurangi penurunan harga saham di
bawah harga penawaran publik.
Keywords: GARCH; green shoe option; stock price volatiliy
 JEL classification: G18 (Government Policy and Regulation)
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Introduction
It is not an easy task for the issuers and
underwriters of an IPO to decide the stock
price to be offered by predicting the condi-
tions and the market demand for the stock
because of  uncertainty. The study team of
BAPEPAM (2007) said that the initial trad-
ing period of the IPO stocks was a critical
period. One of the anomalies that was not
broadly documented, which related to IPO
stocks, was the phenomenon of the positive
initial return. This positive initial return
would have a tendency for the short-term
investor/speculator to sell the stock. Hence,
the price volatility would increase. This con-
dition certainly influences the trust of  the
investors and could have an impact on the
market as a whole.
One explanation for this positive initial
return phenomenon could be categorized into
some mainstream, one of them is the under-
pricing theory. The explanation based on un-
derpricing said that for several reasons, the
offer pr ice was intentionally set by the un-
derwriter at a price below the full informa-
tion value, hence, after entering the second-
ary market the price will be higher than the
IPO’s price. As a consequence, a positive IR
is observed. In this mainstream, among oth-
ers, Baron (1982) and Seha M. Tinic (1988).
However, many empirical discoveries did not
support the underpricing approach, among
others Ritter (1984), Muscarella and
Vetsuypens (1989) and  Drake and
Vetsuypens (1993). The underpricing ap-
proach had also failed to explain the other
IPO anomaly, the long-r un underper-
for mance. The study conducted by Roy
Sembel (1996) provided new explanations
regarding these IPO anomalies. Underwriters
are informed, long-term players. They have
2 reputations which should be protected.
First, their reputation among the frequent
investors that they had not caused an over-
price on an offer. Second, their reputation
among the issuing firms that they had not
caused an underpriced IPO issue. Both sides
of their reputation motivates the underwrit-
ers to determine the IPO at its full informa-
tion value (Sembel 1996). The WIPO model
that had been developed was able to explain
the anomaly of the positive initial return as
well as the long-run underperfor mance
anomaly.
The increased possibility of price vola-
tility due to the phenomenon of positive ini-
tial returns (which leads to the tendency for
short-term investors to sell their new IPO’s
shares), will reduce investor confidence and
impact on the overall market. In the end, the
stock market becomes less attractive to com-
panies that want to raise funds from public
sources. To prevent this happening,  the
BAPEPAM regulation No XI.B.1 permitted
the stock underwriter to initiate stabilization
for a certain period, with certain prerequisites.
The stock price stabilization had to be con-
ducted by the stabilization agency, at a time
when the stock price has experienced a price
decrease to below its initial offer price, by
guarding the stock price for a certain period
after the stock has been registered on the
stock exchange. This market stabilization is
conducted by purchasing and selling the
stock, which has the aim of preventing or
slowing down the price decrease after the
IPO. This stabilization effort is intended to
create a more structured secondary market
for stocks at their initial offering.
In several countries, the market stabili-
zation mechanism after the IPO uses the
green shoe/over-allotment offer options. The
basic idea of the green shoe or the over-al-
lotment options is to create a mechanism
which can lessen the volatility of  the stock’s
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price after its registration on the exchange.
Hence, the aim of these options is to pre-
vent or to impede the stock price’s decrease
during a certain period, as a consequence of
the existence of the selling pressure caused
by the short-term investors, and to create a
well organized market for the stock. (The
Study Team for the Practice and Regulation
of the Green Shoe Option 2007).
In Indonesia, regulations regarding this
option have not yet been individually orga-
nized, however, they are part of a regulation
regarding the price stabilization. However,
some companies in Indonesia, which have had
an IPO have used this green shoe option, as
an instrument to lessen the stock’s price vola-
tility after its registration date on the stock
exchange. In 2007, the BAPEPAM-LK study
team conducted a study, which compared the
practice and regulation of the green shoe
option in some countries, and at this moment,
in accordance with the team’s recommenda-
tion,  the blueprint for the change of
BAPEPAM’s –LK no XLB.4 regarding the
stabil ization of the stock price in conjunc-
tion with the Initial Public Offering, is already
at the discussion stage to accommodate the
green shoe regulation.
Based on the basic idea of the green
shoe or over-allotment options, that is, they
are mechanisms to reduce the stock pr ice
volatility after it is registered on the stock
exchange, this study has tried to examine how
far the implementation of the green shoe
option is effective in controll ing the stock
price volatility after its registration. Accord-
ing to the writer’s observation there has been
no similar study that has already been con-
ducted to complete this BAPEPAM-LK’s
study. Therefore the writer hopes that the
findings of this study can contribute to the
enrichment of the input into the discussions
conducted by the Otoritas Jasa Keuangan (In-
donesia Financial Services Authority) or OJK.
The study of the green shoe was con-
ducted by the BAPEPAM-LK team, however,
only with respect to the comparison between
the practices and regulations in some coun-
tries. A comprehensive study about the ef-
fectiveness of this stabilization program at
muffling the stock price volatility after its
registration on the stock exchange, has not
yet been done until now. Therefore, the for-
mulation of this study is to find out how ef-
fective the green shoe option is in stabilizing
a stock’s price after its IPO. Therefore this
study aimed to study the green shoe option’s
stabilization program to lessen the stock price
volatility of companies that have done an IPO.
To study the effectiveness of the green
shoe option, this study used data of the stock
prices of the issuers who have used the green
shoe option, and the issuers who now use it.
The analysis of the green shoe option con-
ducted by this study may, hopefully, become
an important input to complete the
BAPEPAM-LK’s study and the study con-
ducted by the OJK.
Literature Study
The green shoe option is one of several
forms of  stock price stabilization. It is a stock
purchasing mechanism used by the stabiliz-
ing agent to prevent the stock price from de-
creasing to below the initial offer price, after
the finish of the initial offering period. This
stabilization policy is still regulated by a de-
cree by the Head of BAPEPAM no. Kep-SS/
PM/1996 regarding price stabilization, fo-
cused on the initial offer price. However, this
decree still does not specifically include the
green shoe option. The aim of the price sta-
bilization is to stabilize the stock’s price on
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the stock exchange and to provide a safety
net for the investor.
This green shoe option also known as
the over-allotment option, pioneered by the
Green shoe manufacturing company (now
called Stride-rite corp.) in the United States
in 1919. The green shoe option is a clause
found in the underwriting agreement for a
company conducting its IPO, which enables
the underwriter to sell more than 15 percent
of the agreed quantity of shares if the de-
mand from the public is greater than the num-
ber of  shares on offer. As long as the under-
writer can increase the stock when the mar-
ket is oversubscribed by employing the green
shoe option, price stabilization can be cre-
ated during the IPO.
The green shoe option has been used
many times in several countries, such as the
United States, the United Kingdom, Hong
Kong, and Australia. This gives an opportu-
nity to the issuer’s guarantor to allocate more
shares than offered by the issuer. The role of
the underwriter is conducted when the stock
price experiences a decrease to below that of
the IPO, by guarding the stock price for a
certain period after the stock has been regis-
tered on the stock exchange. The price stabi-
lization is proposed to prevent or at least to
slow down the stock price’s decrease after the
IPO. This is done to make the buying and
selling of the shares on the stock exchange
more organized and stable.
According to the BAPEPAM-LK study
team (2007), the stock price decrease gener-
ally happened because of the increased cir-
culation of the shares, or because there was
a mistake in the allocation and pricing pro-
cess. Until now, the price stabilization policy
is still regulated by the decree of the
BAPEPAM head no. Kep-88/PM/1996 re-
garding the Price Stabilization to Ease the
Public Offering. The decree of  the
BAPEPAM head No. Kep-88/PM/1996 is
to change the Kep-17/PM/1991. However,
the decree of  the BAPEPAM head No. Kep-
88/PM/1996 does not yet include the green
shoe option.
In general the Green Shoe Option is
used by big companies and it is not in general
use by small companies. In the United States,
the Green Shoe Option is not specifically
regulated by a certain regulation, however, it
is included in the regulation regarding price
stabilization which is SEC regulation M Rule
104 regarding Stabilization and other Activi-
ties with regard to the public offering. This
M regulation was introduced by the SEC on
December the 20th, 1996 and came into ef-
fect in April 1997. The regulation regulates
the issuer, underwriter, the stock holders and
other par ties’ activities with regard to the
stock offering. The aim is to prevent a mar-
ket manipulation by parties that want to make
a profit from the distribution of the stock,
which would not have been limited in a genu-
ine market. The green shoe option is not spe-
cifically defined in the M Regulation. It is a
right, but not an obligation, given to the un-
derwriter to purchase extra shares at the pub-
lic offering price to safeguard the short posi-
tion of the stock’s distribution, which can be
used at any time, from the beginning of the
public offering until about 30 to 45 days af-
ter it. With this option, the issuer gives the
underwriter the chance to purchase extra
shares from the issuer, so that the underwriter
can allocate more shares to the investors than
permitted or accorded in the share allocation
contract to purchase the shares from the is-
suer. The result of  this allocation is an in-
crease in the shares received by the under-
writer, who can then sell more shares that
were offered at the IPO. Hence, the under-
writer has created a ‘short’ position. The SEC
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does not specifically state the quantity of
shares which can be given by the issuer to
the underwriter. However, the National As-
sociation of Securities Dealers (NASD),
regulates the limit for the green shoe, which
is 15 percent of the total shares offered at
the public offering. The option to purchase
extra shares from issuer will be executed by
the underwriter if  the stock’s price on the
secondary market has increased higher than
its offering price. The option will not be ex-
ecuted if the stock price is below the offer-
ing price. In general, the underwriter will con-
duct the green shoe option at the end of the
stabilization period, exactly before the clos-
ing of  the IPO. It can sell as much as the 15
percent in the agreement or less than that or
none at all, depending on the stock’s price on
the exchange. ‘Penalty bids’ are also allowed,
when the underwriter can get back the com-
missions from the broker when their clients
quickly sell their allocated shares.
In Australia, the stabilization regulation
is directed at influencing the stock price,
which may not happen without the existence
of this regulation. The Australian Securities
and Investments Commission (ASIC) permits
market stabilization with the conditions that
the market stabilization must first fulfill cer-
tain situations and conditions. The stabiliza-
tion conducted must facilitate the stock of-
fering and it cannot cause or create the pos-
sibility of the market being wrong or not to
be well informed.
The provisions concerning the stabili-
zation of prices in Hong Kong published by
the Hong Kong Securities and Futures Com-
mission, as outlined in the Securities and
Futures Regulation No. L.N. 218 year 2002/
282 and 306 (Cap. 571), which specifically
regulates the procedures and requirements for
those who undertake acts of price stabiliza-
tion at the time of the issuance of  securities.
This regulation not only regulates the price
stabilization of the stock, it also regulates the
futures. The price stabilization in this regula-
tion, as published by the Securities and Fu-
tures Commission of Hong Kong, is divided
into two separate activities. First, the primary
stabilizing action. During this stabilization
period, the stabilizing manager can do one or
all of  the following actions: (i) To purchase,
or agree to purchase stock; (ii) to offer, or try
to do everything as intended by the first step,
with the single aim of preventing or to mini-
mize the decrease of  the stock’s price on the
market.
Second, Ancillary stabilizing action. The
stabilizing manager can conduct extra actions,
called ancillary stabil izing actions, in which
the stabilizing manager can do one of, or all
the actions necessary, to allocate a larger
amount of stock than that initially offered
(the over-allotment condition); to sell or agree
to sell stock in such a way as to create a short
position, realizing an option to purchase or
to order stock; and to sell or agree to sell stock
which was obtained because of a primary sta-
bilizing action in connection with the liqui-
dation of any position caused by this primary
stabilizing action.
In the United Kingdom, the green shoe
option is more commonly known as the over-
allotment option, and is a short-time option
provided by the issuer to the stabilization
manager to allocate or to sell extra stock at
the initial public offering with the intention
of  increasing the newly offered stock’s price
at the IPO. The green shoe option and the
stabilizing regulation are regulated by the
Regulations of the markets’ conduct, espe-
cially the MAR. 2 FSA’s Handbook of  Price
Stabilizing Rules. The goal of  the over-allot-
ment is not free from the creation of the price
stabilizing at the IPO as well as at the sec-
ondary offering. Stabilizing is beneficial as a
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safe harbor for an unhealthy market, caused
by a market manipulation or misinformation.
The over-allotment option conducted during
the IPO has a time span which began with
the stock’s sale announcement at the stock
exchange and ends not more than 30 calen-
dar days after that announcement. Whereas,
the over-allotment option during the second-
ary offering has a time span beginning with
the announcement date to the public regard-
ing the stock’s final IPO sale price and end-
ing not more than 30 calendar days after the
allocation. The implementation period of the
green shoe option must be the same as with
the stabilizing period. The total green shoe
option will not be more than 15 percent of
the total offering. The green shoe option can
only be exercised by the underwriter if the
stock is over allotted. The green shoe option
in the United Kingdom cannot be separated
from the price stabilization. Basically, the
price stabilizing activity is an activity to ma-
nipulate the price in the market. However,
this is permitted under certain conditions.
In Indonesia, price stabilization is done
by the issuer aiming to guard or to defend the
issuer’s stock market after the stock
exchange’s registration of  the stock, in order
prevent it from going down to below the
IPO’s price. When implementing the option,
the investor is provided with the opportunity
to sell if the price tends to decrease. This
option is conducted through two methods,
over subscription and allotment subscription.
Over subscription is permitted by the stock-
holder for the underwriter to increase the
amount of shares to be offered, the action
begins since the offering period until the al-
location date, or before the stock issued is
registered on the stock exchange. The over-
subscription method is aimed at increasing
the amount of the offering, if there is more
demand during certain periods. The over-sub-
scription period generally lasts about 3 to 5
working days.
Over-allotment is an option given by
the stock holder to the underwriter to increase
the amount of the offered stock, beginning
from the registration date. The over allotment
is targeted to increase the offered amount if
there is more demand and it is also used to
stabilize the stock price or to slow down the
decrease of  the stock’s price beneath the pub-
lic offered price on the secondary market from
the first time the stock was registered on the
stock exchange until a certain time. The
implementation time for the offering is about
30 working days up to maximum 38 working
days after the stocks registered on the mar-
ket. The working of the green shoe option is
relatively easy. At the beginning, the under-
writers act as the representatives of the is-
suer to find and sell the shares to the inves-
tor at the public offering. The stock price of-
fered to the investor is a result of an agree-
ment between the issuer and the underwrit-
ers. When the stock price has been settled,
the shares can immediately be sold to the in-
vestor. The underwriters must make sure that
the stock price cannot be less than the of-
fered price. It is not easy for the underwriters
to ensure that this will happen. Therefore, the
underwriters can sell more IPO stock than
agreed upon before to the investor. The ad-
ditional stock sold by the underwriter is use-
ful to lessen the fluctuation or volatility of
the price because of the change in demand
of the stock. If having entered the second-
ary market the price decreases, until it is be-
low the public offering price, the underwriter
will repurchase the extra stock sold  to the
investor so that the price will increase again.
At this stage, the underwriter has already re-
ceived a profit because when selling the ex-
tra stock, the price offered to the investor is
as high as the initial price offered. The price
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Table 1. List of Issuers that conducted an
IPO on the Stock Exchange Dur-
ing the Years 2000 - 2013
No. Year IPO Prospectus Green Shoe
Firms Available Firms
1 2013 31 6 2
2 2012 23 18 0
3 2011 25 13 1
4 2010 23 22 2
5 2009 13 8 1
6 2008 19 18 2
7 2007 22 22 0
8 2006 12 10 0
9 2005 8 8 0
10 2004 12 10 0
11 2003 5 5 3
12 2002 17 16 1
13 2001 31 24 0
14 2000 19 11 0
    260 191 12
Source: processed by researcher
stabilization will become very important be-
cause if the IPO stock price becomes less
than the initial price, the investor will get the
perception that the stock concerned is not
worth the price paid, so that an increased
pressure to sell takes place. If the condition
in the market is such, that the stock price is
higher than the initial price, after entering the
secondary market, therefore to stabilize the
stock price, the underwriter can use his/her
right to purchase the extra stock from the is-
suer at the initial offered price and distribute
the stock into the market at the present price,
hence, the underwriter can avoid losses and
hope that the market price will decrease be-
cause of  the extra offering. By influencing the
supply and the demand it is hoped that the
volatility of the stock price will become less
or to become more stable so that the issuer
and the underwriter can minimize the risk of
price fluctuation.
Research Methods
Data and Data Sources
Studies about the effectiveness of the
green shoe option’s implementation were con-
ducted at companies which had conducted
their IPOs during the period from 2000-2013,
by comparing the volatility of the issuers who
did conduct the green shoe option’s stock
price with those who did not implemented
this stabilization. Whereas the stock price was
the daily closing price during 30 up to 38 days
(depending on implementation of the green
shoe option as conducted by the issuer) after
the IPO stock was traded on the secondary
market. This data were obtained by access-
ing some websites, namely www.e-bursa.c om;
www.idx.co. id ; www.finance.yahoo.com ; www.
duniainvestasi.com and by accessing the data
available at the Indonesian Capital Market
Electronic Library (Indonesia Camel) at the
Indonesian stock exchange. The information
related to the green shoe option policy was
obtained from the Initial Public Offering
(IPO) prospectus of each issuer. Table 1 is a
list of issuers that conducted an IPO on the
stock exchange during the years 2000 - 2013.
Between 2000 and 2013, there were 12
listed companies (issuers) which used the
green shoe option policy. Because one of  the
issuers did not have comparable data, this
issuer was not included in this study. There-
fore the total sample used in this study was
only 11 issuers.
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Data Analysis Method
In this study, the GARCH model speci-
fication was developed to identify the stock
price’s volatility after the first day’s transac-
tions on the secondary market. Hill, Griffiths,
and Lim (2012) pointed out that ARCH mod-
els were important econometric models be-
cause they could capture the phenomenon of
volatility clustering and leptokurtic proper-
ties from distribution data. From this GARCH
model estimation, the researcher further com-
pared the stock price volatility of companies
which had applied the green shoe option dur-
ing their IPOs with those that did not con-
duct this stabilization.
Nearly all the study’s results showed that
the stock price distribution data have
leptokuritic, skewness and volatility cluster-
ing characteristics in which all of them were
exactly the opposite of the property of the
Gaussian distribution. Therefore, the descrip-
tive statistics related  to all the above men-
tioned properties would be studied to com-
plete the reasoning for using the GARCH
specification in this study. The Lagrange
Multiplier test to test the existence of the
ARCH structure would be conducted in ad-
vance of the GARCH model estimation.
The mean structure and the variance
equation which was created is as flows:
tt qMApARP   )()( 210 ....... .. (1)
),0(~1 tt hN
2
1
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2
  ttt  .... ....... ........ .......  (2)
To simplify the variance equation,
therefore the error can be expressed as fol-
lows:
This equation follows the ARMA (p,q)
heteroscedastic process. The root of  the
autoregressive which has determined the per-
sistent shaking of the volatility was deter-
mined by the sum of   and . The sum of
the parameters  and  in the variance equa-
tion would determine the shaking of  the vola-
tility persistence. Therefore, the sum of the
two estimation parameters would be used to
compare the volatility of  the company’s IPO
stock price (after its registration date on the
stock exchange) which had used the green
shoe option with companies that had not con-
ducted a price stabilization policy. Compar-
ing the volatility persistence itself was done
from the best GARCH model specification
which created the lowest error. The smaller
the result from the sum of the ARCH/
GARCH parameters showed that the persis-
tence of the shaking volatility of the stock
price had become less.
To compare the amount of  the pa-
rameters of the ARCH/GARCH model’s
parameter, the writer put an issuer who did
try to stabilize and one that had not tried to-
gether, as long as their IPOs were at or about
the same time. The choice of a similar IPO
time was meant to control the possibility of
changes in the economy/the markets condi-
tion which could influence the study’s results.
With the same IPO time, it was hoped that
the efforts to compare the size/amount of
the ARCH/GARCH parameters for both is-
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suers were done in a fairly homogeneous
market.
Results
The development of the GRACH model
specification to study the green shoe option
began with the detection of the characteris-
tics and the distribution of the data covering
the normality test and the detection of  the
existence of the ARCH effect in the study
data. The test using the Jacque-Bera and the
heteroscedasticity test showed that although
some issuer’s stock price data have a normal
distribution, nearly all the issuer’s data (eleven
issuers that had conducted the green shoe
option and eleven which had not) have indi-
cated the heteroscedastic characteristics.
Therefore, the GARCH specification was the
right model to catch such data.
Table 2 shows the result of the ARCH
test effect for eleven issuers which had prac-
ticed the green shoe and eleven issuers that
had not done it.
The best GARCH model estimation
conducted on eleven issuers stock pr ices
which had practiced the green shoe option
and eleven issuers that had not conducted a
post issue IPO stabilization program is shown
in the Table 3.
Table 2. The ARCH Effect Data of  the Issuers Stock
1 16.46235 0.0000 1* 10.32270 0.0013
2 32.38159 0.0000 2* 28.22822 0.0000
3 22.54884 0.0000 3* 8.619264 0.0033
4 5.207848 0.0225 4* 14.03197 0.0002
5 18.66639 0.0000 5* 6.408751 0.0114
6 24.07919 0.0000 6* 9.065797 0.0026
7 15.19015 0.0001 7* 5.440754 0.0197
8 27.10154 0.0000 8* 22.63292 0.0000
9 27.60550 0.0000 9* 2.878254 0.0898
10 14.59456 0.0001 10* 2.878254 0.0898
11 0.003194 0.9549 11* 22.84702 0.0000
Issuers
with Green
Shoe
Option
Results
Obs*R- Prob. Chi
squared -Square(1)
Issuers
without
Green Shoe
Option
Results
Obs*R- Prob. Chi
squared -Square(1)
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The GARCH models applied to the
stock prices of all the issuers were the best
models because these applied models all had
errors that were homoscedastic.
Table 3 indicated that there were 2
(two) issuers that could not have their pa-
rameters compared, because the researcher
could not find the positive ARCH/GARCH
parameter. Therefore, the result of  the com-
parison of  the parameters in Table 2 indicated
that 8 of the 9 issuers that had employed the
green shoe option stabilization, had smaller
parameters (+) that were smaller than the
number of parameters (+) of the issuers
that had not conducted the green shoe op-
tion. This indicated that, for the issuers that
did not practice the green shoe option, their
stock prices’ volatility were more persistent
compared to the issuers that had conducted
stabilization with the green shoe options’
stock price. In other words, the stock price
of the issuers that had conducted the green
shoe option during the stabilization period
had experienced a volatility decrease which
tended to accelerate.
Hence, the empirical evidence indicated
that the price stabilization practice which was
used by the issuers that had conducted an IPO
during the period from 2000-2013 on the In-
donesian Stock Exchange was in general ef-
fective in muffing the stock prices’ volatility,
so that according to the researcher this green
shoe option (over-allotment option) program
can be used to prevent or to dampen the stock
prices’ decrease to under the public offering
price during certain periods. This study is in
accordance with the finding that the under-
writer played an important role in stabilizing
the IPO’s stock price after it entered the sec-
ondary market (Aggarwal 2000). This is be-
cause the underwriter must take the risk out
from the uncertainty (Bower 1989), so that
the price stabilization policy (which must be
explained in the prospectus) can reduce the
risk of  the underwriter.
The success of the issuer and under-
writer in preventing the decrease of the stock
price can provide a safe feeling for the inves-
tor. Besides, the controlled volatility is ex-
pected to provide a special attraction both
for the issuer, the underwriter, as well as for
the stock exchange institution. For the un-
derwriter and issuer, this stabilization program
could minimize the risk of price fluctuation.
This controlled volatility, can provide posi-
tive signals to the investor that the issuer and
underwriter have both a good reputation and
prospects for the future. A positive signal
from the investor will make it easier for the
issuer and the underwriter when returning to
the market in order to get the financing for
the next stage of  an offer. On the other hand,
for the stock exchange institutions itself (in
this instance the BEI), the controlled price
volatility of  the issuer’s stock will make the
stock market become an interesting place for
the companies to get funds, so that it is hoped
the amount of companies that will conduct
an IPO will increase.
Conclusion
The result of the compar ison of the
parameter model as applied in this study, be-
tween the issuer which did apply the green
shoe option and the issuer that did not con-
duct the stabilization policy, shows that in
general, the green shoe option is a stabiliza-
tion instrument which could lessen (control)
price volatilities during the period in which
the stabilization program is conducted (35
trading days). This result was shown by 8 of
the 9 issuers which had conducted the green
shoe stabilization, as they had smaller param-
eters (+) of ARCH/GARCH compared to
issuers that had not conducted the stabiliza-
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tion. In other words, during the stabilization
period, for the issuers that did use the green
shoe option, their stocks experienced a
muffled volatility which tended to acceler-
ate. The findings regarding the effectiveness
of the green shoe option in this study hope-
fully can complete the result of the
BAPEPAM-LK study team and strengthen
the team’s recommendations in pushing the
recommendation for the green shoe regula-
tion individually.
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